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Abstract
A Proof of Sequential Work (PoSW) allows a prover to convince a resource-bounded verifier that the
prover invested a substantial amount of sequential time to perform some underlying computation.
PoSWs have many applications including time-stamping, blockchain design, and universally verifiable
CPU benchmarks. Mahmoody, Moran, and Vadhan (ITCS 2013) gave the first construction of
a PoSW in the random oracle model though the construction relied on expensive depth-robust
graphs. In a recent breakthrough, Cohen and Pietrzak (EUROCRYPT 2018) gave an efficient PoSW
construction that does not require expensive depth-robust graphs.
In the classical parallel random oracle model, it is straightforward to argue that any successful
PoSW attacker must produce a long H-sequence and that any malicious party running in sequential
time T − 1 will fail to produce an H-sequence of length T except with negligible probability. In this
paper, we prove that any quantum attacker running in sequential time T − 1 will fail to produce
an H-sequence except with negligible probability – even if the attacker submits a large batch of
quantum queries in each round. The proof is substantially more challenging and highlights the power
of Zhandry’s recent compressed oracle technique (CRYPTO 2019). We further extend this result to
establish post-quantum security of a non-interactive PoSW obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir
transform to Cohen and Pietrzak’s efficient construction (EUROCRYPT 2018).
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1 Introduction
As we make progress towards the development of quantum computers, it is imperative to
understand which cryptographic primitives can be securely and efficiently instantiated in
a post-quantum world. In this work, we consider the security of proofs of sequential work
against quantum adversaries.
A proof of sequential work (PoSW) [37, 23, 3, 26] is a protocol for proving that one spent
significant sequential computation work to validate some statement χ. One motivation for a
proof of sequential work is in time-stamping, e.g., if Bob can produce a valid proof πχ that
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N sequential steps were spent to validate χ, then Bob can prove that he must have known
about χ at least time Ω(N) seconds in the past. A verifier should be able to validate the
proof πχ quickly, i.e., in time polylog(N).
Mahmoody et al. [37] gave the first construction of a proof of sequential work in the
random oracle model. Their construction was based on labeling a depth-robust graph,
i.e., given a random oracle H and a directed acyclic graph G = (V = [N ], E) with N
nodes and an initial input x, we can compute labels ℓ1, . . . , ℓN , where the label of the
source node is ℓ1 = H(χ, 1, x) and an internal node v with parents v1, . . . , vδ has label
ℓv = H(χ, v, ℓv1 , . . . , ℓvδ ).
The prover commits to labels ℓ′1, . . . , ℓ′N (a cheating prover might commit to the wrong
labels) and then the verifier selects a random subset S ⊂ [N ] of |S| = c challenge nodes.
For each challenge node v ∈ S with parents v1, . . . , vδ, the prover reveals ℓ′v along with
ℓ′v1 , . . . , ℓ
′
vδ




If we let R denote the subset of locally inconsistent nodes, then the verifier will accept with
probability at most (1− |R|/N)c.
Mahmoody et al. [37] selected G such that G was ϵ-extremely depth-robust1, meaning
that for any set R ⊆ [N ] of locally inconsistent nodes, there is a directed path of length
T + 1 = (1− ϵ)N −R. This path P = v0, . . . , vT corresponds to an H-sequence of length T
where an H-sequence is any sequence of strings x0, . . . , xT with the property that H(xi) is
a substring of xi+1 for each i < T . Note that the labels ℓ′v0 , . . . , ℓ
′
vT have this property. In
the classical parallel random oracle model (pROM), it is relatively straightforward to prove
that any algorithm running in T − 1 rounds and making at most q queries in total fails




when H : {0, 1}δλ → {0, 1}λ
outputs binary strings of length λ [23].
The ϵ-extreme depth-robust graphs used in the construction of Mahmoody et al. [37]
were quite expensive, having indegree δ = Ω̃(logN). Alwen et al. [7] showed how to construct
ϵ-extreme depth-robust graphs with indegree just O (logN) though the hidden constants
were quite large. Cohen and Pietrzak [23] gave an efficient (practical) construction that
avoids depth-robust graphs entirely by cleverly modifying the Merkle tree structure to obtain
a graph G on N = 2n+1 − 1 nodes2, for any integer n ≥ 1.
Both proofs of sequential work can (optionally) be converted into a non-interactive proof
by applying the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [28], i.e., given a commitment c′ to labels ℓ′1, . . . , ℓ′N
we can use public randomness r = H(χ,N+1, c′) to sample our set of challenge nodes S. The
non-interactive version could be useful in cases where a prover wants to silently timestamp
a statement χ without even signaling that s/he might have a statement important enough
to timestamp, e.g., a researcher who believes they might resolved a famous open problem
may wish to timestamp the discovery without signaling the community until s/he carefully
double checks the proof.
In all of the above constructions, security relies on the hardness of computing H-sequences
of length T in sequential time T − 1. While this can be readily established in the classical
parallel random oracle model, proving that this task is in fact hard for a quantum attacker
is a much more daunting challenge. As Boneh et al. [16] pointed out, many of the convenient
1 A DAG G is said to be ϵ-extremely depth-robust if it is (e, d)-depth robust for any e, d > 0 such that
e + d ≤ (1 − ϵ)N where N is the number of nodes in G. Recall that a DAG G = (V, E) is (e, d)-depth
robust if for any subset S ⊆ V with |S| ≤ e there exists a path of length d in G − S.
2 The graph G is “weighted” depth robust. In particular, there is a weighting function w : V → R≥0
with the property that
∑
v
w(v) ∈ O (N log N) and for any subset S ⊆ V with sufficiently small weight∑
v∈S w(v) ≤ cN the DAG G − S contains a path of length Ω(N).
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properties (e.g., extractability, programmability, efficient simulation, rewinding, etc.) that
are used in classical random oracle security proofs no longer apply in the quantum random
oracle model (qROM). An attacker in the (parallel) quantum random oracle model is able
to submit entangled queries, giving the attacker much more power. For example, given y a





random oracle queries using Grover’s algorithm. By contrast, a classical attacker would
need at least Ω(2λ) queries to a classical random oracle. Similarly, a quantum attacker can




queries, while a classical attacker requires Ω(2λ/2)
queries. In this paper, we explore the post-quantum security of proofs of sequential work in
the parallel quantum random oracle model. We aim to answer the following questions:
Can a quantum attacker running in T − 1 sequential rounds produce an H-sequence
of length T?
Can a quantum attacker running in time T = (1−α)N produce a valid non-interactive
proof of sequential work with non-negligible probability?
1.1 Our Contributions
We answer these questions in the negative, thus confirming the security of proof of sequential
work schemes in a post-quantum world. We first prove that any quantum attacker making
N − 1 rounds of queries cannot produce an H-sequence of length N , except with negligible
probability.
▶ Definition 1 (H-Sequence). An H-sequence x0, x1, . . . , xs ∈ {0, 1}∗ satisfies the property
that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ s, there exist a, b ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that xi = a||H(xi−1)||b. For indexing
reasons, we say such an H-sequence has length s (even though there are s+ 1 variables xi).
In the classical random oracle model (ROM), it is straightforward to argue that any PoSW
prover must find a long H-sequence to pass the audit phase with non-negligible probability.
Thus, this result already provides compelling evidence that proofs of sequential work are
post-quantum secure in the parallel random oracle model.
Next we consider a non-interactive proof of sequential work applying the Fiat-Shamir
transform to the efficient construction of Cohen and Pietrzak [23], and we prove that this
construction is secure in the quantum parallel random oracle model. In particular, we show
that any attacker running in sequential time T = (1− α)N will fail to produce a valid proof
πχ for any statement χ ∈ {0, 1}λ.
While Cohen and Pietrzak [23] proved analogous results in the classical random oracle
model, we stress that from a technical standpoint, proving security in the quantum random
oracle model is significantly more challenging. In general, there is a clear need to develop new
techniques to reason about the security of cryptographic protocols in the quantum random
oracle model. Most of the techniques that are used in classical random oracle model do
not carry over to the (parallel) quantum random oracle model [16]. For example, if we are
simulating a classical attacker, then we can see (extract) all of the random oracle queries
that the attacker makes, while we cannot observe a quantum query without measuring it,
which would collapse the attacker’s quantum state might significantly alter the final output.
Warm-Up Problem: Iterative Hashing
As a warm-up, we first prove an easier result in Theorem 2 that an attacker cannot compute
HN (x) in sequential time less than N − 1 in the parallel quantum random oracle model,
where a similar result was previously proved by Unruh [39] in the (non-parallel) quantum
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random oracle model. Along the way we highlight some of the key challenges that make it
difficult to extend the proof to arbitrary H-sequences.
▶ Theorem 2. Given a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ and a random input x, any
quantum attacker that makes up to q queries in each of N − 1 sequential steps can only







2λ/2 in the quantum parallel
random oracle model.
The proof of Theorem 2 is straightforward and we defer it to the full version. Intuitively,
iteratively computing HN (x) induces an H-sequence x0, x1, . . . , xn with x0 = x, xN = HN (x)
and xi+1 = H(xi). One can easily define a sequence of indistinguishable hybrids where in
the last hybrid the final output xN = HN (x) = H(xN−1) is information theoretically hidden
from the attacker. In general, in hybrid i, for each j ≤ i, the value xj = Hj(x) = H(xj−1)
remains information theoretically hidden until round j. In particular, we replace the random
oracle H with a new stateful oracle H′i(·) that is almost identical to H(·), except that for
any j ≤ i if the query H(xj) is submitted to H′(·) before round j then the response will be a
random unrelated λ-bit string instead of H(xj).
We can argue indistinguishability of hybrids i using a result of [10] because if j > i, then
xj is information theoretically hidden up until round i and the total query magnitude of
xj = Hj(x) during round i is negligible. Here, the total query magnitude of a string xj
during round i is defined as the sum of squared amplitudes on states where the attacker is
querying string xj . It then follows that except with negligible probability a quantum attacker
cannot compute HN (x). The argument does rely on the assumption that the running time
T of the attacker is bounded, e.g., T ≤ 2cλ for some constant c > 0.
Our main results are summarized in Theorem 3 and Theorem 4. We show that quantum
attackers running in at most N − 1 sequential steps cannot find an H-sequence of length
N with high probability. We also show that for any quantum attackers making at most q
quantum queries to the random oracle H over at most (1− α)N rounds will only be able to
produce a valid PoSW with negligible probability.
Technical Challenges: Iterative Hashing vs H-Sequences
Proving that an attacker cannot find an H-sequence of length N in N − 1 rounds of parallel
queries is significantly more challenging. One key difference is that there are exponentially
many distinct H-sequences of length N that are consistent with the initial string x0. By
contrast, when we analyze a hash chain, each value on the chain Hj(x0) can be viewed as
fixed a priori. For H-sequences, it is not clear how one would even define a hybrid where
all candidate values of xi are information-theoretically hidden because these values are not
known a priori and there might be exponentially many such candidates. In fact, for any
2 ≤ i ≤ N and any string y, it is likely that there exists an H-sequence x0, . . . , xN such that
y = xi.
Instead, we use a recent idea introduced by [42] that views the random oracle as a
superposition of databases rather than queries. This view facilitates intuitive simulation of
quantum random oracles in a manner similar to classical models, which provides intuitive
simulation for queries and circumvents the need to “record all possible queries”, which would
give an exponential number of possible H-sequences in our case. We give significantly more
intuition in Section 4, after formalizing the relevant definitions.
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▶ Theorem 3. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ be a random hash function and let δ ≥ 1 be a
parameter. Let p be the probability that a quantum adversary making at most q queries over
N − 1 rounds outputs (x0, y0), . . . , (xN−1, yN−1) and xN s.t. |xi| ≤ δλ, yi = H(xi) and






Here, Substring(yi−1, xi) = 1 means that yi−1 is a substring of xi, i.e., there exist a, b ∈ {0, 1}∗
such that xi = a∥yi−1∥b.
From H-Sequences to Proof of Sequential Work
Theorem 4 focuses on a non-interactive proof of sequential work obtained by applying
the Fiat-Shamir transform to the efficient construction of Cohen and Pietrzak [23]. This
construction is based on a DAG G with N = 2n+1 − 1 nodes and maximum indegree n.
Given a random oracle H : {0, 1}λ(n+2) → {0, 1}λ, an honest prover can generate a proof for
any statement χ ∈ {0, 1}λ in sequential time O (N). We prove that for any constant α > 0,
an attacker making q queries over s = N(1− α) rounds will fail to produce a valid proof of
sequential work for any statement except with negligible probability.
▶ Theorem 4. Suppose A makes at most q quantum queries to our random oracle H
over at most s = N(1 − α) rounds and let p denote the probability that A outputs a valid
(non-interactive) proof of sequential work. Then







The main intuition for the proof Theorem 4 works as follows. Given a quantum database
D = {(xi, yi) : i ≥ 1} where yi encodes the output on input xi with λ bits, we define a set
LUCKYs of databases D based on the graph coloring (see the full version), in which D does
not contain any collision or H-sequence of length s, yet still contains a “lucky” Merkle tree
that has a green path from the challenged node to the root that can be used to extract a
proof of sequential work. We show that any attacker making (possibly parallel) q queries can
only succeed in measuring a lucky database D with negligible probability. Finally, we show
that any attacker who produces a valid PoSW must measure a database D that either (1)
contains an H-sequence of length s, (2) contains a collision, or (3) is a lucky database. Since
each of these events has negligible probability, then it follows that with high probability, the
attacker cannot produce a valid PoSW.
1.2 Related Work
Functions that are inherently sequential to compute are a cryptographic primitive used
in many applications, such as proof of sequential work [37], verifiable delay functions [15],
and time-lock puzzles [36]. The original construction [37] used depth-robust graphs, which
have found applications in many areas of cryptography including memory-hard functions
(e.g., [8, 5, 6, 14, 13, 7, 12]), proofs of replication [29, 20], and proofs of space [27, 38]. Recently,
Cohen and Pietrzak [23] show that H-sequences are difficult for a classical adversary to
compute in the classical parallel random oracle model.
The Quantum Random Oracle Model (qROM) was introduced by Boneh et al. [16], who
pointed out that for any real world instantiation for the hash function H (e.g., SHA3), one
can build a quantum circuit implementing H. Boneh et al. [16] also provided an example
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of a protocol that is secure in the classical ROM, but not in the qROM. Quantum attacks
and constructions under the quantum random oracle model have been studied in a number
of previous settings, such as unclonable public-key quantum money [1, 2], quantum Merkle
puzzles [19, 18], signature schemes [17] and construction of random functions [41].
Security reductions in the classical ROM often exploit properties such as programability
and extractability of queries – properties that are lost in the qROM. Zhandry introduced
compressed oracles [42] as a way to record quantum queries so that they can be viewed after
computation has completed. The new technique has proven to be a useful tool to extend
many classical security proofs to the quantum random oracle model, e.g., [11, 21, 34, 4, 31].
Don et. al. [25] recently showed how queries can be extracted on-the-fly in certain settings,
e.g., once the algorithm outputs a classical commitment t (e.g., t = H(x) or t = Encpk(H(x)))
that is tightly related to the input x.
The non-interactive PoSW we consider in this work is obtained by applying the Fiat-
Shamir transform to the interactive PoSW construction of Cohen and Pieterzak [23]. While
there is a recent line of work analyzing the security of the Fiat-Shamir transform [28] in the
quantum random oracle model [33, 24, 35], applying these results would require us to first
establish the security of the interactive PoSW in the (parallel) qROM. We find it easier to
directly show that the non-interactive PoSW construction is secure in the (parallel) qROM.
There have been a number of work on parallelizing quantum algorithms or considering
parallel queries in the quantum random oracle model. Zalka [40] showed that the parallel
version of Grover’s algorithm is optimal, e.g., in the ideal cipher model, any parallel key-
recovery attacker making at most q = O(
√
k2λ) quantum queries to the ideal cipher must
run in sequential time Ω(
√
2λ/k). Grover and Radhakrishnan [30] generalized Zalka’s result
in the setting of multiple items to search. Jeffery et al. [32] studied the parallel quantum
query complexity for the element distinctness and the k-sum problem. Ambainis et al. [9]
provided an improved one-way to hiding (O2H) theorem in the parallel quantum random
oracle model.
In independent work, Chung et al. [22] also studied the problem of finding an H-sequence
and non-interactive proofs of sequential work in the parallel quantum random oracle model.
They gave comparable bounds also using Zhandry’s compressed oracle technique [42], while
leveraging an abstract view of Fourier transforms for arbitrary finite Abelian groups. By
comparison, our proofs avoid the need for an understanding of abstract algebra, instead using
quantum information theory to bound the quantum query complexity through a reduction
to classical query complexity. Thus we believe our techniques to be of independent interest,
perhaps appealing to a more general audience while also providing the necessary framework
to analyze the security of other classical protocols in a post-quantum world.
2 Preliminaries
Let N denote the set {0, 1, . . .}, [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, and [a, b] = {a, a+ 1, . . . , b}
where a, b ∈ N with a ≤ b. For a function f(x), we recursively define fN (x) = f ◦ fN−1(x)
where ◦ is a function/operator composition. We say that a non-negative function µ(x) is
negligible, if for all polynomials p(x), it holds that 0 ≤ µ(x) < 1p(x) for all sufficiently large x.
Let {0, 1}n be the set of all bitstrings of length n. Then we define {0, 1}≤n = ∪ni=0{0, 1}i
to be the set of all bitstrings of length at most n including an empty string ε. We denote ||
as the concatenation of bitstrings. For a bitstring x ∈ {0, 1}∗, x[i] denotes its ith bit, and
x[i...j] = x[i]|| . . . ||x[j].
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Given quantum states |ϕ⟩ =
∑
αx|x⟩ and |ψ⟩ =
∑
βx|x⟩, we define the Euclidean
distance between the two states to be the quantity
√∑
|αx − βx|2. The magnitude of |x⟩ in
|ϕ⟩ =
∑
αx|x⟩ is αx and the query probability is |αx|2 – when we measure the state |ϕ⟩x we
will observe |x⟩ with probability |αx|2.
2.1 Quantum Random Oracle Model
In the (sequential) quantum random oracle model (qROM), an adversary is given oracle
access to a random hash function H : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}λ. The adversary can submit quantum
states as queries to the oracle, so that H takes as input superposition |ϕ1⟩, |ϕ2⟩, . . .. Each
|ϕi⟩ can be expanded as |ϕi⟩ =
∑
αi,x,y|x, y⟩ so that the output is
∑
αi,x,y|x, y ⊕ H(x)⟩.
Note that when the initial state is of the form |ϕ⟩ =
∑
αx|x, 0w⟩, then the output state will
be of the form
∑
αx|x,H(x)⟩.
Compressed Oracle Technique in the Sequential qROM
Here we introduce the compressed oracle representation introduced by Zhandry [42], which is
equivalent to the standard oracle in function. However, the difference between the compressed
oracle and the regular oracle is in the encodings of the oracle and query registers as queries
are made to the oracles. We will extend the ideas of this technique to the parallel qROM
later on.
First, we formally define a database D. A database D is defined by D = {(xi, yi) : i ≥ 1}
where we write D(xi) = yi to denote that yi encodes the output on input xi with λ
bits. When D = {} is empty, it is equivalent to viewing the random oracle as being in
superposition of all possible random oracles. After q queries, the state can be viewed as∑
x,y,z,D αx,y,z|x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩, where D is a compressed dataset of at most q input/output
pairs, x, y are the query registers, and z is the adversary’s private storage.
Formally, the compressed oracle technique for the sequential qROM works as follows. Let
H : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}λ be a random hash function and suppose an adversary is given an
oracle access to H. Then we have the following observations:
It is equivalent to view the usual random oracle mapping |x, y⟩ 7→ |x, y⊕H(x)⟩ (denote as
StO) as the phase oracle PhsO that maps |x, y⟩ to (−1)y·H(x)|x, y⟩ by applying Hadamard
transforms before and after the oracle query.3
It is also equivalent to view the oracle H as being in (initially uniform) superposition∑
H |H⟩ where we can encode H as a binary vector of length 2m × λ encoding the
λ-bit output for each m-bit input string. Under this view the oracle maps the state
|ϕ⟩ =
∑




x,y αx,y|x, y⟩ ⊗
∑
H |H⟩(−1)y·H(x).
If the attacker makes at most q queries, then we can compress the oracle H and write
|ϕ⟩ =
∑
x,y αx,y|x, y⟩ ⊗
∑
D |D⟩, where each dataset D ∈ {0, 1}λ×2
m is sparse, i.e., D(x) ̸= ⊥
for at most q entries. Intuitively, when D(x) = ⊥, we view the random oracle as being in
a uniform superposition over potential outputs. Moreover, we can think of the basis state
|D⟩ as corresponding to the superposition
∑
H∈HD |H⟩ where HD ⊆ {0, 1}
2mλ denote the set
of all random oracles that are consistent with D, i.e., if H ∈ HD then for all inputs x we
either have D(x) = ⊥ or D(x) = H(x). When viewed in this way, the basis state |D⟩ encodes
prior queries to the random oracle along with the corresponding responses. We can use a
compressed phase oracle CPhsO (described below) to model a phase oracle.
3 Notice that both StO and PhsO are unitary matrices and StO = (Im ⊗ H⊗λ)PhsO(Im ⊗ H⊗λ) where
Im is the identity matrix on the first m qubits and H⊗λ is the Hadamard transform on the λ output
qubits.
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Compressed Phase Oracle
To properly define a compressed phase oracle CPhsO in the sequential qROM, a unitary
local decompression procedure StdDecompx that acts on databases was first defined in [42].
Intuitively, StdDecompx decompresses the value of the database at position x when the
database D is not specified on x and there is a room to expand D, and StdDecompx does
nothing when there is no room for decompression. If D is already specified on x, then
we have two cases: if the corresponding y registers are in a state orthogonal to a uniform
superposition, then StdDecompx is the identity (no need to decompress). If the y registers are
in the state of a uniform superposition, then StdDecompx removes x from D. We refer to the
full version for a full description of StdDecompx. Now we define StdDecomp, Increase,CPhsO′
on the computational basis states as
StdDecomp (|x, y⟩ ⊗ |D⟩) = |x, y⟩ ⊗ StdDecompx|D⟩,
Increase (|x, y⟩ ⊗ |D⟩) = |x, y⟩ ⊗ |D⟩|(⊥, 0λ)⟩, and
CPhsO′ (|x, y⟩ ⊗ |D⟩) = (−1)y·D(x)|x, y⟩ ⊗ |D⟩,
where the procedure Increase appends a new register |(⊥, 0λ)⟩ at the end of the database.
Note that |D⟩|(⊥, 0λ)⟩ is a database that computes the same partial function as D, but the
upper bound on the number of points is increased by 1. Here, we remark that we define
⊥ · y = 0 when defining CPhsO′, which implies that CPhsO′ does nothing if (x, y) has not yet
been added to the database D. Finally, the compressed phase oracle CPhsO can be defined
as follows:
CPhsO = StdDecomp ◦ CPhsO′ ◦ StdDecomp ◦ Increase,
which means that when we receive a query, we first make enough space by increasing the
bound and then decompress at x, apply the query, and then re-compress the database. We
remark that CPhsO successfully keeps track of positions that are orthogonal to the uniform
superposition only because if (x, y) was already specified in D and the y registers are in the
state of a uniform superposition, then StdDecomp removes x from D so that CPhsO′ does
nothing as explained before and the second StdDecomp in CPhsO will revert (x, y) back to
the database.
2.2 Useful Lemmas for Compressed Oracles
Next we introduce some useful lemmas given by Zhandry [42] that are helpful for proving our
main result. We first introduce the following variant of Lemma 5 from [42], which is still true
for CPhsO because StO and PhsO are perfectly indistinguishable by applying a Hadamard
transform before and after each query.
▶ Lemma 5 ([42]). Consider a quantum algorithm A making queries to a random oracle H
and outputting tuples (x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk, z). Let R be a collection of such tuples. Suppose
with probability p, A outputs a tuple such that (1) the tuple is in R, and (2) H(xi) = yi
for all i. Now consider running A with the oracle CPhsO, and suppose the database D is
measured after A produces its output. Let p′ be the probability that (1) the tuple is in R, and







We say that a database D contains a collision if we have (x, y), (x′, y) ∈ D for x ≠ x′. We use
the notation COLLIDE to denote the set of all databases that contain a collision. Zhandry
upper bounded the probability of finding collisions in a database after making queries to a
compressed oracle in the following lemma.
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▶ Lemma 6 ([42]). For any adversary making q queries to CPhsO and an arbitrary number
of database read queries, if the database D is measured after the q queries, the resulting
database will contain a collision with probability at most q3/2λ.
3 Parallel Quantum Random Oracle Model
Quantum Query Bounds with Compressed Dataset
As a warm-up, we review how Zhandry [42] used his compressed oracle technique to provide
a greatly simplified proof that Grover’s algorithm is asymptotically optimal. Theorem 7





. We sketch some of the key ideas below as a warm-up and to highlight
some of the additional challenges faced in our setting.
▶ Theorem 7 ([42]). For any adversary making q queries to CPhsO and an arbitrary number
of database read queries, if the database D is measured after the q queries, the probability it





We can view Theorem 7 as providing a bound for amplitudes of basis states with a
database D in a set BAD that is defined as
BAD = {D : D contains a pair of the form (x, 0λ)}.
Given a basis state |x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ with D ̸∈ BAD and x ̸∈ D, then the random oracle CPhsO
maps this basis state to





where the amplitude on states with the corresponding database D in BAD is just 2−λ/2. We
use the following notation to generalize this approach for other purposes:
▶ Definition 8. For a collection of basis states S̃ and |ψ⟩ =
∑





to denote the root of the sum of the squared magnitudes of the projection of ψ onto the set
of basis states S̃. If S is a set of databases and |ψ⟩ =
∑
x,y,z,D αx,y,z,D|x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ is a






An equivalent way to define L2(|ψ⟩, S̃) is L2(|ψ⟩, S̃) =
∥∥∥PS̃(|ψ⟩)∥∥∥2 where PS̃ projects |ψ⟩
onto the space spanned by S̃ e.g., if |ψ⟩ =
∑




αx,y,z,D|x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩.
Using this notation, we can view the proof of Theorem 7 as bounding L2(CPhsO|ψ⟩,BAD)
− L2(|ψ⟩,BAD), i.e., the increase in root of squared amplitudes on bad states after each
random oracle query.
There are a number of challenges to overcome when directly applying this idea to analyze
H-sequences. First, we note that Theorem 7 works in the sequential qROM, which means
that the attacker can make only one query in each round. In our setting, the quantum
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attacker is allowed to make more than T queries provided that the queries are submitted in
parallel batches over T − 1 rounds. Without the latter restriction, an attacker that makes T
total queries will trivially be able to find an H-sequence, even if the attacker is not quantum,
by computing HT (x) over T rounds. We formalize the parallel quantum random oracle model
pqROM in Section 3.1 to model an attacker who submits batches (x1, y1), . . . of random
oracle queries in each round.
The second primary challenge is that we can not find a static (a priori fixed) set BAD.
A naïve approach would fix BAD to be the set of databases that contain an H-sequence
of length T , but this would not allow us to bound L2(CPhsO|ψ⟩,BAD)− L2(|ψ⟩,BAD). In
particular, if our state |ψ⟩ after round r has non-negligible squared amplitudes on datasets D
that contain an H-sequence of length r + 1, then it is likely that the attacker will be able to
produce an H-sequence of length T after round T − 1 – in this sense a bad event has already
occurred. In our setting, the bad sets must be defined carefully in a round-dependent fashion
r. Intuitively, we want to show that L2(CPhsOk|ψ⟩,BADr+1)−L2(|ψ⟩,BADr) is small, where
BADr contains datasets D that contain an H-sequence of length r + 1 and CPhsOk denotes
a parallel phase oracle that processes k ≥ 1 queries in each round. However, reasoning about
the behavior of CPhsOk introduces its own set of challenges when k > 1. We address these
challenges by carefully defining sets BADr,j , i.e., the bad set of states after the first j (out of
k) queries in round j have been processed. See Section 4 for more details.
3.1 Parallel Quantum Random Oracle Model pqROM
Recall that in the sequential quantum random oracle model (qROM), an adversary can submit
quantum states as queries to the oracle, so that a random hash function H takes as input
superposition |ϕ1⟩, |ϕ2⟩, . . . , and so on. Each |ϕi⟩ can be expanded as |ϕi⟩ =
∑
αi,x,y|x, y⟩
so that the output is
∑
αi,x,y|x, y ⊕H(x)⟩. Note that when the initial state is of the form
|ϕ⟩ =
∑
αx|x, 0w⟩, then the output state will be of the form
∑
αx|x,H(x)⟩. In the parallel
quantum random oracle model (pqROM), the adversary can make a batch of queries q1, q2, . . .
each round and receives the corresponding output for each of the queries. More precisely, if ri
is the number of queries made in round i, then the input takes the form |(x1, y1), . . . , (xri , yri)⟩
and the corresponding output is |(x1, y1 ⊕H(x1)), . . . , (xri , yri ⊕H(xri))⟩.
We also remark that the equivalence of the standard and phase oracles that we discussed
in Section 2.1 remains true with parallelism (by applying Hadamard transforms before and
after the query); therefore, we will only consider extending the compressed oracles only on
the CPhsO by convenience.
Extending Compressed Oracle Technique to pqROM
As mentioned before, we need to extend CPhsO to be able to handle parallel queries. To
make the analysis simpler, we have an approach that essentially sequentially simulates a
batch of parallel queries, which as a result, is equivalent to process parallel queries at once.
Consider the following example; given a state |Bi⟩ = |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩, let |ψ1⟩
be the state after processing the first query (x1, y1), and let |ψ2⟩ be the state after processing
the second query (x2, y2) so that |ψ2⟩ = CPhsO|ψ1⟩. However, recall that CPhsO only acts
on the first coordinate. Thus to handle the parallel query sequentially, we would need to
switch the order of the coordinates to process the second query properly. Hence, we make a
slight modification and redefine |ψ2⟩ = Swap1,2 ◦ CPhsO ◦ Swap1,2|ψ1⟩, where
Swap1,2|(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . .⟩ = |(x2, y2), (x1, y1), . . .⟩,
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and similarly Swapi,j(·) = Swapj,i(·) swaps the positions of queries xi and xj . Thus, we
now define our parallel version of a CPhsO oracle, called as CPhsOi, which handle i parallel
queries, recursively as
CPhsOi = Swap1,i ◦ CPhsO ◦ Swap1,i ◦ CPhsOi−1,
where CPhsO1 = CPhsO. For a compact notation, we define
SCPhsOi := Swap1,i ◦ CPhsO ◦ Swap1,i.
That is, we can interpret CPhsOi as applying SCPhsOj (essentially) sequentially for j =
1, . . . , i, i.e., CPhsOi =
∏i
j=1 SCPhsO
j = SCPhsOi ◦ · · · ◦ SCPhsO1.
We remark that there are other possible approaches in extending CPhsO to the pqROM.
For example, see the full version for further details regarding an additional approach to
extending CPhsO to the pqROM.
4 Finding H-Sequences in the pqROM
In this section, we show that quantum adversaries cannot find H-sequences of length N using
fewer than N − 1 steps, thereby showing the security of a construction for proof of sequential
work in the parallel quantum random oracle model in the next section. Recall that an H-
sequence x0, x1, . . . , xs ∈ {0, 1}∗ satisfies the property that for each 0 ≤ i ≤ s− 1, there exist
a, b ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that xi+1 = a||H(xi)||b. Note that the sequence H(x),H2(x), . . . ,HN (x)
is an H-sequence, so in fact, this proves that quantum adversaries are even more limited
than being unable to compute HN (x) for a given input x in fewer than N − 1 steps. In our
analysis, we require that H outputs a λ-bit string but permit each term xi in the H-sequence
to have length δλ, for some variable parameter δ ≥ 1.
We begin by introducing some helpful notation. Given a database D = {(x1, y1), . . . ,
(xq, yq)} in the compressed standard oracle view, we can define a directed graph GD on q
nodes (vx1 , . . . , vxq ) so that there is an edge from node vxi to node vxj if and only if there
exist strings a, b such that xj = a||yi||b. Thus, the graph GD essentially encodes possible
H-sequences by forming edges between nodes vxi and vxj if and only if yi is a substring of
xj . More precisely, given a path P = (vxi0 , vxi1 , . . . , vxik ) in GD, we define
HSeq(P ) := (xi0 , xi1 , . . . , xik ) denotes a corresponding H-sequence of length k, and
LAST(P ) := vxik denotes the endpoint of the path P in GD that corresponds to the
output of the last label in the corresponding H-sequence.
We also define a predicate Substring(x, y) where Substring(x, y) = 1 if and only if x is a
substring of y, i.e., there exist a, b ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that y = a||x||b, and Substring(x, y) = 0
otherwise.
▶ Example 9. Suppose that D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (x8, y8)} where (x1, y1) = (00000, 000),
(x2, y2) = (00010, 001), (x3, y3) = (00101, 010), (x4, y4) = (00110, 011), (x5, y5) =
(01001, 100), (x6, y6) = (01100, 101), (x7, y7) = (10010, 110), and (x8, y8) = (11001, 111). We
observe that the graph GD induced from the database D should include the edge (v1, v2)
since x2 = 00010 = y1||10, and so forth. Then we have the following graph GD (see the
full version), which includes an H-sequence of length s = 5. In this example, we can say
that for a path P = (v1, v2, v3, v5, v7, v8) of length 5, we have a corresponding H-sequence
HSeq(P ) = (x1, x2, x3, x5, x7, x8) of length 5 since we have x2 = y1||10, x3 = y2||01, and so
on. Note that in this case we have LAST(P ) = v8.
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▶ Definition 10. We define PATHs to be the set of the databases (compressed random oracles)
D such that GD contains a path of length s.
PATHs := {D : GD contains a path of length s}.
Note that PATHs intuitively corresponds to an H-sequence of length s. We also define P̃ATHs
to be the set of basis states with D in PATHs as follows:
P̃ATHs := {|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ : D ∈ PATHs}.
Challenges of Quantum Query Bounds on Finding an H-Sequence
To bound the probability that a single round of queries finds an H-sequence of length s+ 1
conditioned on the previous queries not finding an H-sequence of length s, we consider
the set of basis states {|Bi⟩}i of the form |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩, where D contains
at most q − k entries and D /∈ PATHs. Let |ψ⟩ =
∑
αi|Bi⟩ be an arbitrary state that is
a linear combination of {|Bi⟩}i and let |ψ′⟩ = CPhsOk|ψ⟩. Then we would like to bound
L2(|ψ′⟩,PATHs+1), but there are substantial challenges in computing L2(|ψ′⟩,PATHs+1)
directly.
For example, given a decomposition of |ψ⟩ =
∑
B αB |B⟩ into basis states, we might like to
compute ηB = CPhsOk(|B⟩) for each basis state |B⟩ and then decompose |ψ′⟩ =
∑
B αBηB .
However, each term ηB is no longer a basis state making it difficult to describe the state |ψ′⟩
in a helpful way so that we can bound L2(|ψ′⟩, P̃ATHs+1). The challenges are amplified as
|ψ′⟩ is the result of k parallel queries.
Overcoming the Challenges
Our approach is to consider an intermediate sequence of states |ψ0⟩ = |ψ⟩, . . . , |ψk⟩ = |ψ′⟩,
where |ψi⟩ intuitively encodes the state after the ith query (in the block of parallel queries)
is processed. Then from the definition of CPhsOi, we have |ψi+1⟩ = Swap1,i+1 ◦ CPhsO ◦
Swap1,i+1|ψi⟩ = SCPhsOi+1|ψi⟩ for all i ∈ [k]. This approach presents a new subtle challenge.
Consider a basis state |B⟩ = |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk)⟩ ⊗ |D⟩, where the longest path in GD
(the H-sequence) has length s − 1. We can easily argue that L2(SCPhsO1|B⟩, P̃ATHs+1)
is negligible since the initial basis state |B⟩ ̸∈ P̃ATHs. Now we would like to argue that
L2(SCPhsO2 ◦ SCPhsO1|B⟩, P̃ATHs+1) is negligibly small, but it is unclear how to prove this
since we might have L2(SCPhsO1|B⟩, P̃ATHs) = 1, e.g., all of the datasets D found in the
support of SCPhsO1|B⟩ have paths of length s.
Overcoming this barrier requires a much more careful definition of our “bad” states. We
introduce some new notions to make the explanations clearer. Suppose that a database
D /∈ PATHs. If D has no H-sequence of length s, it may not be the case that |ψi⟩ has no
H-sequence of length s. However, the intuition is that since the queries x1, . . . , xk are made
in the same round, then it is acceptable to have an H-sequence of length s, provided that
the last entry in the H-sequence involves some (xi, yi). Thus we define PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk)
to be a set of the databases with the induced graph GD having a path of length s that does
not end in a term that contains H(xi):
PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk) := {D : GD contains a path P of length s and
LAST(P ) /∈ {vx1 , . . . , vxi}},
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where we recall that LAST(P ) denotes the endpoint of the path P in GD, which corresponds
to the output of the last label in the corresponding H-sequence as defined before. We then
define
P̃ATHs,i := {|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ : D ∈ PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk)},
which denotes the set of the states where the corresponding database D is in the set
PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk).
Now we define a set Contains,i, which intuitively represents the set of databases so that
the queries correspond to the guesses for preimages:
Contains,i(x1, . . . , xk) := {D : ∃j ≤ k s.t. Substring(D(xi), xj) = 1 and
GD contains a path of length s ending at xi}.
We then define
C̃ontains,i := {|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ : D ∈ Contains,i(x1, . . . , xk)},
which denotes the set of the states where the corresponding database D is in the set
Contains,i(x1, . . . , xk). Therefore, we define BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk) to be the set of databases
that are not in PATHs but upon the insertion of (x1, y1), . . . , (xi, yi), is a member of PATHs+1:
BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk) := PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk) ∪
i⋃
j=1
Contains,j(x1, . . . , xk)
Finally, we define
B̃ADs,i := {|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ : D ∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk)}
to represent the set of the states where the corresponding database D is in the set
BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk).
We now process each query (x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk) sequentially and argue that the mass
projected onto PATHs+1 by each step CPhsOi is negligible. To prove this, we argue that
L2(|ψi⟩, B̃ADs,i) is negligible for all i ≤ k. We use the convention that |ψ0⟩ is the initial state
and |ψi⟩ = SCPhsOi|ψi−1⟩ for all i ∈ [k] so that |ψk⟩ is the last state, after all the queries
have been processed. Similarly, we use the convention that B̃ADs,0 = P̃ATHs.
We first give the following lemma.
▶ Lemma 11. Suppose that D′ is a database such that D′(xi+1) = ⊥. If D = D′∪(xi+1, w) /∈
BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk), then D /∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk).
Proof. Since D /∈ PATHs,i(x1, . . . , xk), any path of length s must end at one of the vertices
vx1 , . . . , vxi in the graph GD. Hence, no path of length s ends at vxi+1 unless we have a
duplicate query xj = xi+1 for some j < i+ 1. Now we have two cases:
(1) If xi+1 is distinct from xj for all j < i+1, then by the previous observation we immediately
have that D /∈ PATHs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). Furthermore, GD contains no path of length s
ending at node vxi+1 since any path of length s must end at one of vx1 , . . . , vxi . Hence,
D /∈ Contains,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). Taken together, we have that D /∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk).
(2) If xi+1 = xj (j < i + 1) is a duplicate query, then there might be a path of length s
ending at vxi+1 = vxj in D. However, due to the duplicate we have {vx1 , . . . , vxi} =
{vx1 , . . . , vxi+1}. Therefore, D /∈ PATHs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). Now we want to argue that
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D /∈ Contains,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). Note that D(xi+1) = D(xj) for some j < i + 1, which
implies that Substring(D(xj), xl) = 1 ⇔ Substring(D(xi+1), xl) = 1 for all l ∈ [k]. If
D ∈ Contains,i+1(x1, . . . , xk), then there exists a path of length s ending at xj and
Substring(D(xj), xl) = 1 for some l ≤ k. This implies that D ∈ Contains,j(x1, . . . , xk)
and therefore D ∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk), which is a contradiction. Hence, we have that
D /∈ Contains,i+1(x1, . . . , xk) and therefore D /∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk) in this case as well.
Taken together, we can conclude that if D /∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk), then it is also the case that
D /∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). ◀
▶ Lemma 12. For each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1},






Proof. To argue that the projection onto B̃ADs,i increases by a negligible amount for each
query, we use a similar argument to [42]. Recall that SCPhsOi+1 = Swap1,i+1 ◦ CPhsO ◦
Swap1,i+1. Namely, we consider the projection of |ψi+1⟩ = SCPhsOi+1|ψi⟩ onto orthogonal
spaces as follows:
We first define Pi (resp. P ) to be the projection onto the span of basis states |(x1, y1), . . . ,
(xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ ∈ B̃ADs,i (resp. basis states in B̃ADs,i+1).
Next we define Qi to be the projection onto states |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ ̸∈
B̃ADs,i such that yi+1 ≠ 0 and D(xi+1) = ⊥. Intuitively, Qi represents the projec-
tion onto states that are not bad where SCPhsOi+1|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ =
|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩
∑
w ⊗|D ∪ (xi+1, w)⟩ will add a new tuple (xi+1, w) to the data-
set.
We then define Ri to be the projection onto states |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ such
that |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ /∈ B̃ADs,i, yi+1 ̸= 0 and D(xi+1) ̸= ⊥, so that the
value of xi+1 has been specified in databases corresponding to these states.
Finally, we define Si to be the projection onto states |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ such
that |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ /∈ B̃ADs,i and yi+1 = 0.
Since Pi, Qi, Ri, Si project onto disjoint states that span the entirety of |ψi+1⟩ then we
have Pi + Qi + Ri + Si = I, where I denotes the identity operator. We analyze how P
acts on these components separately. For the component Pi|ψi⟩, it is easy to verify that
∥P ◦ SCPhsOi+1(Pi|ψi⟩)∥2 ≤ ∥SCPhsOi+1(Pi|ψi⟩)∥2 ≤ ∥Pi|ψi⟩∥2. See the full version for the
formal proof of Lemma 13.
▶ Lemma 13. ∥P ◦ SCPhsOi+1(Pi|ψi⟩)∥2 ≤ ∥Pi|ψi⟩∥2.
Next, to analyze how the projection P acts on SCPhsOi+1(Qi|ψi⟩), we note that SCPhsOi+1(
|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩) = |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗
∑
w 2−λ/2(−1)w·yi+1 |D ∪
(xi+1, w)⟩ for any basis state in the support of Qi|ψi⟩. We then use a classical counting argu-
ment to upper bound the number of strings w such that |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗
∑
w |D ∪
(xi+1, w)⟩ ∈ B̃ADs,i+1 by decomposing the databases in BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk) into the data-
bases in PATHs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk) and the databases in
⋃i+1
j=1 Contains,j(x1, . . . , xk). Intuitively,
since D ̸∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk) the only way to have D ∪ (xi+1, w) ∈ PATHs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk) is
if w is a substring of some xj with j ≤ k or w is the substring of some other input x in
the database D. We bound the number of databases in PATHs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk) by noting
that any string x ∈ {0, 1}δλ contains at most δλ unique contiguous substrings of length λ,
so there are at most δλ values of w such that Substring(w, x) = 1. Since |D ∪ (xi+1, w)⟩
contains at most q entries, then by a union bound, there are at most qδλ strings w such
J. Blocki, S. Lee, and S. Zhou 22:15
that exists x ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that Substring(w, x) = 1 and D(x) ̸= ⊥ or x = xi+1. Thus,
|{w : D ∪ (xi+1, w) ∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk)}| ≤ qδλ. We similarly bound the number of data-
bases in
⋃i+1
j=1 Contains,j(x1, . . . , xk) by noting that if D ̸∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk) then the only
way for D∪ (xi+1, w) to be in
⋃i+1
j=1 Contains,j(x1, . . . , xk) is if for some j ≤ k the string w is
a substring of xj i.e., Substring(w, xj) = 1. A similar argument shows that the number of
strings w such that D ∪ (xi+1, w) ∈
⋃i+1
j=1 Contains,j(x1, . . . , xk) is at most kδλ.
We thus show the following (see the full version for the full proof):
▶ Lemma 14. ∥P ◦ SCPhsOi+1(Qi|ψi⟩)∥22 ≤
qδλ+kδλ
2λ .
We next consider how P acts upon the basis states of SCPhsOi+1(Ri|ψi⟩). We first
relate this quantity to SCPhsOi+1(|x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D′ ∪ (xi+1, w)⟩), where D′ is the database D
with xi+1 removed. Since D = |D′ ∪ (xi+1, w)⟩ ̸∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk), then we again use
a similar classical counting argument to upper bound the number of strings w′ such that
D′ ∪ (xi+1, w′) ∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). Lemma 15 then follows from algebraic manipulation
similar to [42]. See the full version for the formal proof.
▶ Lemma 15. ∥P ◦ SCPhsOi+1(Ri|ψi⟩)∥22 ≤
9(qδλ+kδλ)
2λ .
Finally, we bound the projection of P onto the states of SCPhsOi+1(Si|ψi⟩):
▶ Lemma 16. ∥P ◦ SCPhsOi+1(Si|ψi⟩)∥2 = 0.
Proof. We observe that P ◦ SCPhsOi+1(Si|ψi⟩) = 0, since for any basis state |(x1, y1), . . . ,
(xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ state in the support of Si|ψi⟩, we have
SCPhsOi+1|(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ = |(x1, y1), . . . , (xk, yk), z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩,
i.e., SCPhsOi+1(Si|ψi⟩) = Si|ψi⟩. We also note that since D ̸∈ BADs,i(x1, . . . , xk) and xi+1
is not being inserted into the dataset that D ̸∈ BADs,i+1(x1, . . . , xk). Hence, we have that
∥P ◦ SCPhsOi+1(Si|ψi⟩)∥2 = 0. ◀
Thus from Lemma 13, Lemma 14, Lemma 15, Lemma 16, and by triangle inequality, we have
∥P ◦ SCPhsOi+1|ψi⟩∥2 ≤ ∥P ◦ SCPhsOi+1(Pi|ψi⟩)∥2 + ∥P ◦ SCPhsOi+1(Qi|ψi⟩)∥2
















Since we have ∥P ◦ SCPhsOi|ψi⟩∥2 = L2(|ψi+1⟩, B̃ADs,i+1) and ∥Pi|ψi⟩∥2 = L2(|ψi⟩, B̃ADs,i),





We now bound the probability that a single round of queries finds an H-sequence of
length s+ 1 conditioned on the previous queries not finding an H-sequence of length s.
▶ Lemma 17. Let |ψ⟩ be an initial state and let |ψ′⟩ = CPhsOk|ψ⟩. Then we have





Proof. We consider the sequence of states |ψ⟩ = |ψ0⟩, . . . , |ψk⟩ = |ψ′⟩ with |ψi⟩ = CPhsOi|ψ⟩.
By Claim 18 it suffices to bound L2(|ψk⟩, B̃ADs,k) as L2(|ψk⟩, P̃ATHs+1) ≤ L2(|ψk⟩, B̃ADs,k).
See the full version for the proof of Claim 18.
ITC 2021
22:16 On the Security of Proofs of Sequential Work in a Post-Quantum World
▷ Claim 18. P̃ATHs+1 ⊆ B̃ADs,k.
Recall that we use the convention B̃ADs,0 = P̃ATHs and |ψ0⟩ is the initial state so that
by Lemma 12,




L2(|ψi+1⟩, B̃ADs,i+1)− L2(|ψi⟩, B̃ADs,i)
]























We now show that a quantum adversary that makes up to q rounds over N − 1 rounds
can only find an H-sequence of length N with negligible probability.
▶ Lemma 19. Suppose that in each round i ∈ [N − 1], the adversary A makes a query
to the parallel oracle CPhsOki and that the total number of queries is bounded by q, i.e.,∑N−1
i=1 ki ≤ q. Then A measures a database in PATHN with probability at most
32q3δλ
2λ .
Proof. Let |ψ0⟩ be the initial state and let Ur represent a unitary transform applied by A in
between batches of queries to the quantum oracle. Then we define |ψr⟩ = Ur ◦CPhsOkr |ψr−1⟩
for each round r ∈ [N − 1]. Thus, the attacker A yields a sequence of states |ψ0⟩, . . . , |ψN−1⟩.
We remark that Ur may only operate on the state |x, y, z⟩ and cannot impact the compressed
oracle D, e.g., Ur (|x′, y′, z′⟩ ⊗ |D⟩) =
∑
x,y,z αx,y,z|x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩. Thus,
L2(Ur ◦ CPhsOkr |ψr−1⟩, P̃ATHr+1) = L2(CPhsOkr |ψr−1⟩, P̃ATHr+1),
so we can effectively ignore the intermediate unitary transform Ur in our analysis below.






+ L2(|ψi−1⟩, P̃ATHi) .
By the triangle inequality we have




















Thus we have shown that a quantum adversary that makes N − 1 rounds of parallel
queries should generally not find an H-sequence of length N within their queries. Then we
bound the probability that the quantum adversary outputs an H-sequence of length N by a
standard approach, e.g. [23, 42] of additionally the probability that the quantum adversary
makes a “lucky guess”.
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▶ Theorem 3. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}λ be a random hash function and let δ ≥ 1 be a
parameter. Let p be the probability that a quantum adversary making at most q queries over
N − 1 rounds outputs (x0, y0), . . . , (xN−1, yN−1) and xN s.t. |xi| ≤ δλ, yi = H(xi) and






Proof. By Lemma 5 the probability p is upper bounded by 2p′ + 2N2−λ where p′ denotes
the probability that an attacker measures D ∈ PATHN . By Lemma 19 we have p′ ≤ 32q
3δλ
2λ
and the result follows immediately. ◀
5 Security of PoSW in the pqROM
In this section, we show the security of a construction for proofs of sequential work in the
parallel quantum random oracle model (pqROM). Here, we focus on the non-interactive
version of PoSW, which can be obtained by applying a Fiat-Shamir transform to the PoSW
defined in [23]. Note that the PoSW defined in both [37] and [23] are interactive, in which a
statement χ is randomly sampled from the verifier and the prover constructs a proof based
on the input statement χ.
5.1 The Definition of Non-Interactive PoSW
We first formally define the non-interactive PoSW in the random oracle model.
▶ Definition 20 (Non-Interactive PoSW). A Non-Interactive Proof of Sequential Work
(niPoSW) consists of polynomial-time oracle algorithms ΠniPoSW = (Solve,Verify) that use
public parameters, as defined below.
Public Parameters. Security parameter λ ∈ N and a random oracle H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}λ.
Solve. Given a time parameter T ∈ N, the statement χ, P computes a solution π ←
SolveH(·)(1λ, T, χ). The final proof is (χ, π).
Verify. P can verify that the proof is genuine by running {0, 1} ← VerifyH(·)(1λ, T, χ, π).
We require the following properties:
(1) Correctness. For any χ ∈ {0, 1}λ, λ, T ∈ N we have
VerifyH(·)(1λ, T, χ,SolveH(·)(1λ, T, χ)) = 1.
That is, an honest prover should always produce a valid proof with probability 1,
regardless of the choice of the statement χ ∈ {0, 1}∗, running in time parameter T and
security parameter λ.
(2) Efficiency. Solve should run in time T · poly(λ) and Verify should run in time
poly(λ, log T ). Similarly, the solution π must have size poly(λ, log T ).
(3) Security. We say that a construction ΠniPoSW is (T (·), q(·), ϵ(·))-secure (resp. ΠniPoSW is
(T (·), q(·), ϵ(·))-quantum secure) if any algorithm A running in sequential time at most
T = T (λ) in the pROM (resp. pqROM) and making at most q = q(λ) total queries to the
random oracle should fail to produce a valid proof for any statement χ ∈ {0, 1}λ (selected
by the adversary) except with a negligible probability ϵ(λ), i.e., if (π′, χ)← AH(·)(1λ, T )




VerifyH(·)(1λ, T, χ, π′) = 1
]
≤ ϵ(λ),
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the random oracle H.
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5.2 The Underlying DAG GPoSWn ([23])
We will use the same DAG in our construction of the non-interactive PoSW as the DAG
defined in [23]. Here, we briefly recall their construction of the DAG GPoSWn (the figure is
given in the full version). For n ∈ N, let N = 2n+1 − 1 and first construct a complete binary
tree Bn = (V,E′) of depth n, where |V | = N and all the directed edges go from the leaves
towards the root. We identify the N nodes V = {0, 1}≤n with the binary strings of length at
most n except for the root, and we let the root be the empty string ε. Below the root we
add directed edges from nodes 0 and 1 to node ε. Similarly, for each node v we add directed
edges from nodes (v∥0) and (v∥1) to v. Here, ∥ denotes the concatenation of the strings.
Now we define the DAG GPoSWn = (V,E) by starting with Bn = (V,E′) and appending some
edges as follows:
For all leaf nodes u ∈ {0, 1}n, add an edge (v, u) for any v that is a left sibling of a node
on the path from u to the root ε.
For example, for u = 0110, the path from u to the root is 0110→ 011→ 01→ 0→ ε and the
left siblings of the nodes on this path are 010 and 00. Hence, we add the edges (010, 0110)
and (00, 0110) to E′. We refer to [23] for the full description of GPoSWn .
5.3 The Non-Interactive Version of [23] Construction
Applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to the interactive PoSW construction [23], we have the
following algorithms Solve and Verify in the non-interactive PoSW construction. For the
notational simplicity, let Gn = GPoSWn be the underlying DAG from [23].
SolveH(·)(1λ, T, χ, C):
Compute the labels of the graph Gn with n = 1+⌈log T ⌉, i.e., compute ℓi = Hχ(i, ℓpi1 , . . . ,
ℓpi
di
), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , where pi1, . . . , pidi denotes the parents
4 of node i and Hχ(·) := H(χ, ·).
Compute R = Hχ(N + 1, ℓε) and parse R to get k = ⌊λ/n⌋ strings c1, . . . , ck ∈ {0, 1}n.
Compute the challenges C = {c1, . . . , ck} where each n-bit string ci corresponds to a leaf
node in Gn.
Prove that everything on the path from node ci to the root is locally consistent. This can
be done by a Merkle tree reveal MT.Reveal, which reveals the labels of all the siblings on
path from node ci to the root. More precisely, for a node y ∈ {0, 1}≤n, we define
MT.Reveal(y) = {ℓy[0...j−1]∥(y[j]⊕1)}kj=1,
where we recall that y[0 . . . j] denotes the substring of y to the jth bit and y[0 . . . 0] denotes
the empty string. In this way, we can reveal the labels of all the siblings on path from x
to the root ε. In particular, a solution π consists of the following:
π = {ℓε, ci,MT.Reveal(ci) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
Output (χ, π).
VerifyH(·)(1λ, T, χ, π):
Parse π to extract ℓ′ε and c′1, . . . , c′k. Set R′ = Hχ(N + 1, ℓ′ε) and split R′ to obtain
k = ⌊λ/n⌋ challenges c′′1 , . . . , c′′k each of length n. Output 0 if c′′i ≠ c′i for any i ≤ k.
Otherwise, let (pi1
′
, . . . , pidi
′) = parents(c′i) for each i.
4 Given a DAG G and a directed edge (u, v) we say that node u is a parent of node v. While this is the
standard notion of parent in a DAG it can be counter-intuitive since the “tree” edges in our DAG are
directed towards the root i.e., nodes 011 and 010 are both parents of node 01.






′ from π for each i ≤ k and j ≤ d′i.
Check that each leaf node c′i is locally consistent. That is, one checks that ℓ′c′
i
is correctly
computed from its parent labels:
ℓ′c′
i
?= Hχ(c′i, ℓ′pi1′ , . . . , ℓpidi
′) where (pi1
′
, . . . , pidi
′) = parents(c′i).
(Note that in Gn all of c′i’s parents are siblings of nodes on the path from c′i to the root
ϵ).




[0...i] := Hχ(c′i[0...i], ℓc′i[0...i]∥0, ℓc′i[0...i]∥1),
and verify that the computed root ℓc′
i
[0...0] is equal to ℓε ∈ π that we received in the proof.
5.4 Security
We argue that for any fixed constant α > 0 the non-interactive proof of sequential work
outline above is (T = (1− α)N, q, ϵ)-secure for ϵ(λ) = 32q2(1− α)⌊λ/n⌋ + 2q32−λ + 64q3(n+
2)λ2−λ + 2⌊λ/n⌋(n + 2)2−λ. We first define a set LUCKYs of databases D in which D
contains no collision or H-sequence of length s, yet the dataset D contains a lucky Merkle
tree that can be used to extract a proof of sequential work for some statement χ. We then
argue that any attacker making q queries fails to measure such a lucky dataset D except
with negligible probability. This is true even if the attacker is not restricted to run in
sequential time s. Finally, to complete the argument we argue that any cheating attacker who
produces a valid proof of sequential work can be converted into an algorithm that measures
a dataset D that either (1) contains an H-sequence of length s, (2) contains a collision or
(3) is in LUCKYs. Assuming that our attacker is sequentially bounded and makes at most q
queries, the probability of any of these three outcomes must be negligible. Thus, the PoSW
construction must be secure against any sequentially bounded attacker.
Coloring the Graph GnPoSW
Given a database D, a statement χ, and a candidate PoSW solution y = ℓϵ we define an
algorithm ColoredMTD(χ, y) which returns a copy of the DAG GPoSWn in which each node
is colored red or green. Intuitively, green nodes indicate that the corresponding labels are
locally consistent with the database D while red nodes are locally inconsistent. If the PoSW
solution ℓϵ is entirely consistent with D then every node in GnPoSW will be colored green. On
the other hand, if there is no entry of the form (x, y) ∈ D then the root node in GnPoSW would
be colored red along with every other node below it. To define ColoredMTD(χ, y) we use a
recursive helper function ColorSubTreeD which outputs a colored subgraph rooted at an
intermediate node v. We briefly introduce how these algorithms work below and refer to the
full version for the complete descriptions.
(1) The algorithm ColorSubTreeD(χ, v, xv, yv) generates a subset of nodes that consists of
a Merkle subtree along with the coloring of each node in the set.
5 Note that if we have another entry (x′1, y1) ∈ D satisfying x′1 = χ∥1∥ℓ10∥ℓ11 then we have a collision in
the database and we do not have a parsing fail here. Similar argument holds for another parsing fail
case in (3) as well. We will deal with the case that the database has collisions separately and assume
that we do not have any collisions so that a unique Merkle subtree is generated as output.
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D = {(xε = χ∥ℓ0∥ℓ1, yε), (x0 = χ∥0∥ℓ00∥ℓ01, y0),
(x1 = χ∥0∥ℓ10∥ℓ11, y1), (x01 = χ∥01∥ℓ010∥ℓ011, y01),







x1 ̸= χ∥1∥ℓ10∥ℓ11, parsing fail!
ℓ0 = y0
ℓ00 = y00
̸∃x00 s.t. (x00, y00) ∈ D
ℓ01 = y01
ℓ010 = y010
(x010, y010) ∈ D, but
ℓ′00 ̸= ℓ00, local inconsistency!
ℓ011 = y011
Figure 1 A succinct illustration of ColorSubTreeD(χ, ε, xε, yε) where ε is an empty string and the
database D is defined as above. Note that since n = 3, the nodes on the lowest layer are leaf nodes
and the dashed edges are shown to help understand how the coloring works (we do not actually draw
the edges in the algorithm). As described above, we have the following cases to color the node to red:
(1) in node 1, there exists x1 such that (x1, y1) ∈ D, however, x1 cannot be parsed properly, i.e.,
x1 ≠ χ∥1∥ℓ10∥ℓ11 (parsing fail5), (2) in node 00, there is no x00 such that (x00, y00) ∈ D (undefined
entry in D), and (3) in node 010 – which is a leaf node – we have an entry (x010, y010) ∈ D, but
when parsing x010 into χ∥010∥ℓ′00, we observe that the predefined label ℓ00 of node 00 and the value
ℓ′00 does not match (local inconsistency).
The algorithm takes as input (χ, v, xv, yv) where χ ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a statement, v ∈
{0, 1}≤n denotes a node in GD6, and xv ∈ {0, 1}∗, yv ∈ {0, 1}λ are the bitstrings.
Here, yv is a potential candidate to be the label of node v. It outputs a subset of
nodes V ′ ⊆ V (GD), which consists of a Merkle subtree with root node v and the
corresponding coloring set Color(V ′) := {Color(v) : v ∈ V ′}.
Recall that a node v is green if it is locally consistent; for example, let (x, y) ∈ D
and for node v with label ℓv = y, if v0, v1 with labels y0, y1 are the parents of v then
v is locally consistent if and only if it satisfies Hχ(v, y0, y1) = y. Since we satisfies
H(x) = y as (x, y) ∈ D, one would need to satisfy x = χ∥v∥y0∥y1 for v to be locally
consistent.
Hence, we start parsing xv into χ∥v′∥yv∥0∥yv∥1 and see if it succeeds. That is, check
if v′ = v. If it fails, then we say it as “parsing fail”, which is illustrated in Figure 1
(node 1). In this case, we color the node red and stop generating the subtree.
If we succeed to parse xv, then we color v to green and can proceed to its parents and
see if there is an entry in the database D with having its y-coordinate as the label of
its parent node. If it fails, then it becomes our second fail and we color the node red
and stop generating the subtree. It is illustrated in Figure 1 (node 00).
When we color the leaf nodes, we follow the same procedure except that we could
have more than two parents based on the edge structure in [23], and we have another
6 We remark that v corresponds to the identification of a node that is a binary string of length at most n,
different from the label of the node ℓv.
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possibility of “parsing fail” because the labels of its parents should be predefined by
construction. If this kind of parsing fail occurs (node 010 in Figure 1), then we color
the node to red.
(2) ColoredMTD(χ, y) generates a complete Merkle tree rooted at a node ε with label ℓε = y
and appends the edges as shown in [23]. The algorithm works simple; find an entry
(x, y) ∈ D and call ColorSubTreeD(χ, ε, x, y). Fill the missing nodes with label ⊥ and
color them all red. Then we add the edges as described in Section 5.2. If there is no
such (x, y) in D then we abort the entire algorithm. We refer to Figure 2 for an example








00 01 10 11
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
Figure 2 One example of ColoredMTD(χ, y) where n = 3 and (x, y) ∈ D. On the left side is the
output of ColorSubTreeD(χ, ε, x, y) (different from Figure 1) and we fill the undefined nodes colored
red and add the edges on the right side. Note that newly added nodes and edges are shown in blue.
Notations
Recall that in Definition 10, we defined PATHs to be the set of the databases (compressed
random oracles) D such that GD contains a path of length s, which corresponds to the
H-sequence of length s. Now we define the set COLLIDE to be the set of the databases that
contains a collision:
COLLIDE := {D : D contains pairs (x, y), (x′, y) such that x ̸= x′}.
Given a node (string) v = (v1∥ . . . ∥vn) ∈ {0, 1}n, we use v≤i ∈ {0, 1}i to denote the substring
v1∥ . . . ∥vi, v≤0 := ε, and we use PTR(v, χ) = {v≤i : 0 ≤ i ≤ n} to denote the set of all nodes
on the direct path from v to the root of a Merkle tree constructed from ColoredMTD(χ, ·).
Given a coloring of the Merkle tree, we define the predicate gPTR(v, χ), which verifies that
every node on the path from v to the root is green.7 That is, gPTR(v, χ) = 1 if and only if
Color(v′) = green for all v′ ∈ PTR(v, χ) and 0 otherwise. For example, in Figure 2, we have
gPTR(011, χ) = 1 because the color of nodes in PTR(011, χ) = {011, 01, 0, ε} are all green.
On the other hand, we observe that gPTR(000, χ) = 0 despite the node 000 is green as we
have an intermediate red node 00 in PTR(000, χ).
Now we define LUCKY(D, χ, y) to be the set of λ-bit strings that produce lucky challenges
for the Merkle tree rooted at y:
LUCKY(D, χ, y) := {w ∈{0, 1}λ : w = w1∥ . . . ∥wk∥z where k = ⌊λ/n⌋,
|wi| = n, and gPTR(wi, χ) = 1 ∀0 ≤ i ≤ k}.
7 Here, PTR stands for “Path To the Root” and gPTR stands for “green Path To the Root”.
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Then the set LUCKYs is defined to be the set of databases that contains lucky challenges not
in COLLIDE and PATHs, i.e.,
LUCKYs :={D : ∃(x, y) ∈ D s.t. x = χ∥N + 1∥ℓϵ ∧ y ∈ LUCKY(D, χ, ℓϵ)}
\ (COLLIDE ∪ PATHs) .
We also define L̃UCKYs to be the set of basis states with D in LUCKYs as follows:
L̃UCKYs := {|x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ : D ∈ LUCKYs}.
We remark that when defining the set LUCKYs, we need to assume that D ̸∈ COLLIDE to
ensure that we get a unique Merkle tree rooted at ℓε and we additionally need to assume
that D ̸∈ PATHs otherwise the set {v ∈ {0, 1}n : gPTR(v, χ) = 0} may not be large, i.e., if
all nodes are green.
We also define PRE(D) to be the set of λ-bit strings w that become a preimage of a hash
value. It happens when w is a substring of x where (x, y) ∈ D.
PRE(D) := {w ∈ {0, 1}λ : ∃(x, y) ∈ D s.t. Substring(w, x) = 1}.
Security of PoSW against Quantum Attackers
Let Gn = (V,E), Color(V )← ColoredMTD(χ, ·). We first introduce a helper lemma that is a
classical argument (not quantum) and comes immediately from rephrasing the intermediate
claim in the proof of [23, Theorem 1].
▶ Lemma 21 ([23]). If D ̸∈ COLLIDE and D ̸∈ PATHT with T = (1−α)N for some constant
0 < α < 1, then
|{v ∈ {0, 1}n : gPTR(v, χ) = 0}| ≥ α2n ,
i.e., at least α2n out of 2n challenges (leaf nodes) in Gn must fail to respond correctly.
We immediately have the following corollary which bounds the number of tuples (v1, . . . , vk, y)
such that all challenges vi are lucky i.e., gPTR(vi, χ) = 1 ∀i ≤ k. Here, y ∈ {0, 1}k
′ is an
auxiliary string.
▶ Corollary 22. If v1, . . . , vk are the leaf nodes in Gn (i.e., vi ∈ V, |vi| = n ∀i ≤ k), then we
have that∣∣{(v1, . . . , vk, y) : gPTR(vi, χ) = 1 ∀i ≤ k, y ∈ {0, 1}k′}∣∣ ≤ 2nk+k′(1− α)k.
▶ Lemma 23. Let α be any constant satisfying q ≤ 2
λ(1−α)⌊λ/n⌋




αx,y,z,D|x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩
whose database register is a superposition of databases with at most q entries, we have
L2(CPhsO|ϕ⟩, L̃UCKYs)− L2(|ϕ⟩, L̃UCKYs) ≤ 4(1− α)
⌊λ/n⌋
2 .
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Proof. (Sketch) The proof of Lemma 23 is similar to Lemma 12. We provide a complete
proof in the full version and sketch the high level details here. We consider the projection
of |ϕ′⟩ = CPhsO|ϕ⟩ onto orthogonal spaces P,Q,R, S where (1) P projects onto the span
of basis states |x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ ∈ L̃UCKYs, (2) Q projects onto states |x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ such that
|x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ ̸∈ L̃UCKYs, y ̸= 0, and D(x) = ⊥, (3) R projects onto states |x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩
such that |x, y, z⟩ ⊗ |D⟩ ̸∈ L̃UCKYs, y ̸= 0, and D(x) ̸= ⊥, and (4) S projects onto states
|x, y, z⟩⊗|D⟩ such that |x, y, z⟩⊗|D⟩ ̸∈ L̃UCKYs and y = 0. Then since P,Q,R, S project onto
disjoint states that span the entirety of |ϕ′⟩ then we have P +Q+R+S = I, where I denotes
the identity operator. We analyze how P acts on these components separately and have that
∥P ◦ CPhsO(P |ϕ⟩)∥2 ≤ ∥P |ϕ⟩∥2, ∥P ◦ CPhsO(Q|ϕ⟩)∥
2
2 ≤ (1−α)⌊λ/n⌋, ∥P ◦ CPhsO(R|ϕ⟩)∥
2
2 ≤
9(1− α)⌊λ/n⌋., and ∥P ◦ CPhsO(S|ϕ⟩)∥2 = 0. Then by triangle inequality, we have that
∥P ◦ CPhsO|ϕ⟩∥2 ≤ ∥P ◦ CPhsO(P |ϕ⟩)∥2 + ∥P ◦ CPhsO(Q|ϕ⟩)∥2
+ ∥P ◦ CPhsO(R|ϕ⟩)∥2 + ∥P ◦ CPhsO(S|ϕ⟩)∥2
≤ ∥P |ϕ⟩∥2 + (1− α)
⌊λ/n⌋
2 + 3(1− α)
⌊λ/n⌋
2
≤ L2(|ϕ⟩, L̃UCKYs) + 4(1− α)
⌊λ/n⌋
2 .
Since we have that ∥P ◦ CPhsO|ϕ⟩∥2 = L2(CPhsO|ϕ⟩, L̃UCKYs), we complete the proof. ◀
From Lemma 23, we have the following Lemma. The proof of Lemma 24 can be found in
the full version.
▶ Lemma 24. Suppose that our quantum attacker A makes at most q queries to CPhsO
then the probability p′ of measuring a database D ∈ LUCKYs for s = N(1 − α) is at most
16q2(1− α)⌊λ/n⌋.
▶ Theorem 4. Suppose A makes at most q quantum queries to our random oracle H
over at most s = N(1 − α) rounds and let p denote the probability that A outputs a valid
(non-interactive) proof of sequential work. Then







Proof. Suppose that A make queries to a random oracle H and outputs tuples ((x1, y1), . . . ,
(xk, yk), z) and let R be a collection of such tuples that contain a valid PoSW for some
statement χ ∈ {0, 1}λ. Recall that with probability p, the algorithm A outputs a tuple such
that (1) the tuple is in R (contains a valid PoSW), and (2) H(xi) = yi for all i. Now consider
running A with the oracle CPhsO (applying the Hadamard Transform before/after each
query) and measuring the database D after A outputs. We first observe that if the final tuple
is in R and D(xi) = yi for all i, then we must have D ∈ LUCKYs+1 ∪ PATHs+1 ∪ COLLIDE.
In particular, if D does not contain an H-sequence of length s + 1 or a collision, then we
must have D ∈ LUCKYs+1 since the proof of sequential work is valid.
However, the probability of measuring a dataset D ∈ LUCKYs+1 ∪ PATHs+1 ∪ COLLIDE
can be upper bounded by 16q2(1−α)⌊λ/n⌋ + 32q3(n+ 2)λ2−λ + q32−λ by applying Lemma 24
(Lucky Merkle Tree), Lemma 19 (Long H-sequence), and Lemma 6 to upper bound the
probability that D ∈ LUCKYs+1, D ∈ PATHs+1 and D ∈ COLLIDE, respectively.
We also observe that the number of input/output pairs in our PoSW is k = ⌊λ/n⌋(n+ 2)
since we have ⌊λ/n⌋ challenges where each challenge consists of a statement χ, a node itself,
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which implies that













c implies a ≤ b+ c+ 2
√
bc ≤ 2(b+ c) for any a, b, c > 0. ◀
6 Conclusion
We have shown that any attacker in the parallel quantum random oracle model making
q ≪ 2λ/3 total queries cannot find an H-sequence of length N in N − 1 sequential rounds
except with negligible probability. Using this result as a building block, we then prove that
the non-interactive proof of sequential work of Cohen and Pietrzak [23] is secure against any
attacker making q ≪ 2λ/n queries and running in sequential time T = (1− α)N . We leave
it as an open question whether or not the λ/n term from this lower bound is inherent or
whether the construction could be tweaked to establish security when q ≪ 2λ/n. The main
technical hurdle is extracting more than λ/n challenges from a single random oracle output
or adapting the proof to handle a modified construction where we extract challenges from
multiple random oracle outputs. An alternative approach would be to introduce a second
random oracle with longer outputs, which could be used to extract Ω(λ) challenges.
Our results also highlight the power of the recent compressed random oracle technique of
Zhandry [42] and raises a natural question about whether or not these techniques could be
extended to establish the security of important cryptographic primitives such as memory-hard
functions or proofs of space in the quantum random oracle model. Alwen and Serbinenko [8]
previously gave a classical pebbling reduction in the classical parallel random oracle model
showing that the cumulative memory complexity of a data-independent memory hard function
is tightly characterized by the pebbling complexity of the underlying graph. Would it be
possible to establish the post-quantum security of memory hard functions through a similar
reduction in the parallel quantum random oracle model?
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